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C.I.A.—How Super the Sleuths?

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

Director Allen Dulles: Triumphs and Disasters



Newsweek—Tony Rollo

CIA: How Super the Sleuths?

There are areas of government—of every government—that by their nature must operate in secrecy. The CIA—the Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S. Government, which does everything from counting Russian missiles to capturing counterspies—is such an area.

Using only facts already known to the Russians, NEWSWEEK *Senior Editor James M. Cannon puts together a picture of the agency whose role in Laos and Cuba has blown up a new storm of controversy.*

After the passengers left the Russian Aeroflot liner at the field outside Vienna, a ground crew came aboard to clean up and get the plane ready for the return flight. There was the usual litter—a tattered magazine, paper napkins, the remains of sandwiches, empty bottles—and all went into the trash, along with a bent coat hanger and a broken cup. A few hours later the airport garbage concessionaire loaded the trash in his little truck and hauled it away. En route to the dump, he stopped and delivered the box of Soviet trash, which had been kept separate, to a man who was willing to pay for it. The man was not a crazy junk collector; he was an agent for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Sifting through the trash, the CIA agent spotted the coat hanger, and remembered it was on his priority list. He picked it out, along with several other items, wrapped them, and left them in an appointed spot—in this case a locker in a busy railroad station. When the package arrived at the nearest CIA headquarters, the agent's superiors were elated. To them, what seemed like an ordinary coat hanger was more valuable than diamonds.

CIA knew, from scraps of information put together, that the Russians were building a powerful long-range bomber. They knew about test flights, numbers of planes in production, and even had photographs of the plane. They did not know its range or bombload, but they did know that shavings from the machining of the wing were remelted and made into a particular type of coat hanger.

At last, the CIA had obtained one. By chemical tests and spectroanalysis, the agency learned exactly what metals were being used in the wing of the plane. The formula for the alloy was the last piece in the puzzle; with that, CIA's experts in aircraft engineering could tell both the range and the bombload of that particular Soviet bomber.

The little-publicized case of the Red coat hanger was typical of the CIA at its best. Unfortunately, the CIA was in the news this week because of two defeats. (These defeats were so spectacular that President Kennedy is considering transferring some of the functions of CIA elsewhere.)

One setback was in Laos, where the CIA decided to support the power of Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, mainly on the ground that he was strongly anti-Communist. He was—but the CIA entirely overlooked the fact that he also was politically unpopular, and his army was almost entirely worthless.

The other humiliation was in Cuba, where the CIA clearly failed to grasp the political realities of the situation. The CIA believed the information it received from one group of Cuban refugees, that the Cuban people were ripe for revolution; it discounted the information that said this simply was not so.

One day recently, after the defeat of the attempt (made with CIA help) to overthrow Castro, Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, sat in his office overlooking the Potomac, contemplating the tragic incident. Dulles is an impressive man. His height (6 feet), white hair, leonine head, and erect bearing give him the stamp of distinction. Normally, he radiates an ebullient confidence. But on that sad and somber afternoon, Dulles's eyes seemed tired, his face was drawn, and his shoulders sagged.

Too Soon? Too Late? Speaking slowly and carefully, Dulles conceded that Castro's strength had been underestimated. But he emphasized that the Cuban rebel group taking part in the landing had their own intelligence; and that they—the men who were actually going to risk their lives—were convinced that they could get ashore and hold a beachhead until Cuban rebel reinforcements could come in. "They were determined to fight Castro," Dulles said. "Were we to say 'no'? Were we to tell them, 'it's too soon' or 'it's too late'? Were we to tell them 'it's no use'?"

Dulles expected criticism and was

ready for it. It was only a year ago that he and the CIA were under attack, at home and abroad, because of the failure of the U-2 operation; and he has long since become accustomed to public outcries against his agency.

Part of the criticism, of course, springs from the fact that—apart from a handful of insiders—no one knows how much money the agency spends, or how it spends it; and after a couple of blowups like Cuba and Laos, people begin to wonder whether it's worth the money.

"I am the head of a silent service and cannot advertise my wares," director Dulles once said. "Sometimes, I admit, this is a bit irksome . . . For major reasons of policy, however, public relations must be sacrificed to the security of our operations."

Despite its public defeats, the fact is that CIA has scored some major coups:

▶In 1955, a CIA communications expert was poring over a map of the Berlin city plan when he noticed that at one point the main Russian telephone lines ran underground only 300 yards from a radar station in the American sector. The CIA tunneled underground and tapped in on the cables. They recorded every word the Russians said for months before the tunnel was discovered.

▶Until pilot Francis Powers was shot down, the U-2 operation was one of the most successful spy operations ever undertaken anywhere. From 15 miles up, the U-2 took pictures that could distinguish between a cyclist and a pedestrian; its radio recorders—which could cover all wave lengths—took down millions of words. The information that one U-2 could bring back on a single mission kept thousands of people working overtime for weeks—and the flights went on for four years.

▶When Nikita Khrushchev delivered his famous—and secret—speech to the Twentieth Communist Party Congress in February 1956, it was a CIA agent who finally got the text of the speech for the Western world, and it was the CIA that made public for the first time the words of Nikita Khrushchev denouncing the crimes of Joseph Stalin.

These accomplishments are only the best known of the very real victories that the CIA has won for the U.S. in the dangerous game of espionage. But there are others, less dramatic, that the CIA can point to with pride. In 1950, for example, when Soviet agents launched a major drive in France to get White Russians to return to their homeland, the CIA agents went to work with dispatch. They interviewed all the possible returnees, and found among them a boy who was going back with his parents, but who himself was anti-Communist. The CIA talks with him paid off: Nine years later he again made contact; he then held a highly sensitive technical position inside the U.S.S.R., and turned over invaluable information.

Even in Communist China, the CIA has contacts. When, to take one case, Red leader Mao Tse-tung gave confidential instructions to a visiting delegation of Latin American Communists, CIA had a detailed report on the meeting by the time the Latin Americans arrived back home. The anonymous heroism of the agent who succeeded in this coup is typical of the CIA man at his best.

There is no doubt, however, that CIA is saddled with too many "spooks"—pompous amateurs, more visible than numerous, often with great responsibilities. They toss out CIA slang casually ("surface" for coming out from under cover, "apparat" for a CIA network, etc.), pal around together, even tend to dress alike. Once it was pure Brooks Brothers; later, the trench coat and pork-pie hat.

'Psst': One veteran State Department official recalls the time when he was sitting on the terrace of the Hotel-am-Zoo in Berlin, making idle chatter about the CIA with a friend, when a waiter poked him on the shoulder and whispered: "Psst." The State Department man looked up and saw the waiter pointing to a table behind him. Sure enough,



For its many operations around the globe, the CIA has more than 15,000 members; but only four are publicly acknowledged. Allen W. Dulles has been director since 1953. His deputy is Air Force Gen. Charles P. Cabell, who played a key role in the U-2 flights. In charge of cloak-and-dagger work, radio monitoring, and writing reports for the President is Robert Amory Jr. Richard M. Bissell Jr., an economist, directs operations that include aerial missions, guerrilla warfare, and propaganda.

there sat the CIA man—with trench coat and pork-pie hat.

In Washington itself, the tales about the CIA seem endless.

There is the story about two personal friends of President Kennedy who gave a costume party to honor the New Frontier. Quite a few of the frontiersmen showed up—Adlai Stevenson, Averell Harriman, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Kenneth Galbraith, Stewart Udall. The best costume, the guests agreed, was worn by a bearded man in a green fatigue uniform, with a mock submachine gun slung over his shoulder.

The wearer: Robert Amory Jr., deputy director of intelligence for CIA. The time: Three months ago, when the CIA was planning the Cuban operation.

Within the CIA in Washington, nonetheless, almost all employes have at least a "shallow cover," and even secretaries are instructed to tell their friends: "I work for the Army." The need for "compartmentation" and the doctrine of "need to know" are constantly dinned into all members of the agency. People who work in one office may have absolutely no idea what is going on in the next office; many doors are fitted with combination locks; every man is supposed to ask himself: "Does he need to know?" if even a close colleague asks him an official question. One CIA man who reports directly to Allen Dulles says that if their discussion gets off one project and drifts to another, Dulles will suddenly stop and say: "I won't talk about that."

No Social Blunder: Although Dulles is one of Washington's greatest party-goers—"Next to Mrs. Cafritz, Allen has the busiest social calendar in town," says one old friend—he is rarely accused of dropping an indiscreet remark.

A main device to prevent a Communist from getting into the CIA is the lie-detector test that all employes must take.

Amid the welter of questions, there are always two: "Have you given any official information to anyone?" "Have you had any homosexual relations?"

"It isn't that the polygraph helps us catch people lying," said one CIA official. "It makes people tell the truth."

Even some old-time CIA employes are unnerved by the test, and prospective employes have been known to break down from the nervous strain. (They are rejected as emotionally unstable.)

These tests—and others—make sure that as far as is humanly possible, the CIA agents who do go abroad on clandestine missions will not crack under the strain of continual danger, or under the stress of fear for the failure of the mission itself.

While clandestine intelligence will always be vital, perhaps 80 per cent of all information about what is going on in Communist countries is obtained openly. U.S. diplomats and military attachés sta-



Associated Press

Plus and Minus

Bright success and grim failure have marked the fourteen-year history of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the Berlin tunnel that CIA dug in 1955 (above), agents listened in on Soviet military telephones and Teletypes for months before the Russians caught on. On a CIA tip, Col. Rudolph Abel (left), a Russian spymaster operating in Brooklyn, was discovered in 1957 and jailed; and breaking the Abel spy ring closed off a major channel of information the Soviets had in the U.S. But tragedy caught the anti-Castro Cuban expedition (below) that CIA helped organize and equip. Castro's own intelligence agents had tipped him off where the landing was to take place, and the Castro guns were waiting before the rebels all reached shore.

Associated Press

tioned in Communist countries like regular reports on what they see and hear; Communist diplomats and attachés do the same in the U.S. Scientists love shoptalk, and all accounts of international scientific conferences are carefully combed for new information.

The nearest newsstand is a potential gold mine of intelligence. We buy Communist publications, just as they buy ours. Some 200,000 pieces of "open literature" are trucked into CIA every month. In the hands of an expert, a provincial paper, technical magazine, road map, or timetable might provide the missing piece of a puzzle. And the CIA has experts on almost everything. One official who has served in several branches of government, including the CIA, says: "There is more talent per square foot in the CIA than in any other branch of the government—even allowing for all the oddballs and incompetents."

Experts on Exports: There are experts on Soviet schools and on Chinese boat-building. There are button experts—men who can learn much about Russian production methods by examining the buttons the Russians are making. There are experts in factory markings who can look at a dockside photograph taken anywhere in the world and, by reading the markings on the crates, tell what's in the box, when and where it was made, and its eventual destination. There are people who can tell from a change in the freight rates of the Czechoslovak state railway that a new factory has probably opened in a town in the Urals that is not on any map.

All such odds and ends are carefully assessed, evaluated, and stored away. "The heart of intelligence is the record system," one U.S. expert likes to say, and CIA has what is probably the world's most extensive and efficient system of intelligence records. It contains almost everything—detailed vital statistics of foreign countries, data on the quality of Uzbek farm machinery, a physical description of an obscure Communist leader in Outer Mongolia.

The Machine: The records are available 24 hours a day. Suppose, for example, a CIA man in Western Europe needs information about Ludwig Koch (a fictitious name), who claims to be a travel agent in Chemnitz. The name goes off to Washington, and a young girl runs it through the central index. Out comes a long list of names, aliases, addresses, and associations. She eliminates the references that are obviously wrong, and sends the man in the field a detailed report on Koch. It might show that he was telling the truth; or it might show that he was a Nazi soldier who defected to the Russians in World War II, drinks heavily, gambles, and has a brother-in-law inside Russia.

CIA must have information readily available on people behind the Iron Curtain, in neutral countries, in allied countries, and in the U.S. too. Suppose there is a sudden need for an American expert on Islamic law; CIA must be able to locate him. (The odds are that anyone reading this story is included in the CIA files—if he has ever been in the armed forces, has ever applied for a passport, or has accomplished something in a particular field, or simply attained success in his career. For that matter, the reader is probably in the Russian central intelligence files, too.)

Of all CIA's responsibilities, one of the most important, but least-known, is counterespionage. The Communist espionage network is vast, extensive, relentless. Communists are known to have stolen the U.S. secret of the A-bomb, to have penetrated American defense plants, to have people at the United Nations who handle nothing but espionage. Russia always denies such activity, but it may be presumed that the Communists are engaged in more espionage than all the free world put together.

After the U-2 incident, CIA prepared a "Casebook/Soviet Espionage and Subversion" for Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to use in answering Soviet attacks at the U.N. and for President Eisenhower to use in Paris to answer Khrushchev's charges that the U-2 flights violated Russian sovereignty.

Included in the casebook was a detailed account of the operations of Col. Rudolph Ivanovich Abel, the Russian spymaster who was arrested in New York City on June 21, 1957. The CIA and the FBI together cracked the Abel case, but the first information about Abel came from CIA counterintelligence men who questioned Reino Hayhanen, a lieutenant colonel in Soviet intelligence who defected in Paris. The case was so important—defectors are prime sources of intelligence—that Allen Dulles himself flew to New York to meet Hayhanen, guarantee his safety, and help find Abel.

Newsweek—Jim Mahan

CIA headquarters: Chances are your name is in their files

Dulles unquestionably understands the deep motives and bizarre concerns of the professional spy, for he has been an espionage agent himself—and a very good one. Indeed, his personal exploits in Switzerland during World War II suggest that Dulles may well be the best spy the U.S. ever had.

Dulles got into espionage after careers in diplomacy and the law. Born in Watertown, N.Y., on April 7, 1893, he went to Princeton ('14), served in the State

Department for ten years, then joined his older brother, John Foster, in the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. In 1942, Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan asked Allen Dulles to head the OSS office in Switzerland. There, Dulles worked with anti-Nazi Germans trying to assassinate Hitler, got more than 2,000 top secret documents from the German Foreign Ministry, gave the Allies their first reports on the German rocket tests at Peenemünde, and arranged for the surrender of 1 million Germans in Italy. He tried going back to law, but his heart was in intelligence, so he joined CIA and in February of 1953, became its director.

For more than eight years, Dulles has dedicated himself to his job, giving it ten or twelve hours a day, expanding and improving his staff, developing new facilities and techniques, doing his best to make CIA the best intelligence agency in the world. And there is no question but that his devotion has paid off. French and British security officers privately express great admiration for CIA. American intelligence officials—especially the old-timers from OSS days—say that what Dulles has really given the CIA is professionalism. Yet Dulles himself is the first to admit that CIA has much to learn and far to go.

Taking the Blame: After the U-2, the criticism most often heard was that CIA was setting its own policies, that it did not tell President Eisenhower about the Powers planned flight. The truth is that CIA begins no major mission without clearing it with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the President himself. Everyone involved knew that the May Day U-2 flight would be a great risk especially with the summit coming up; but the information the U-2 was to gather was so important that the CIA wanted to take the risk anyway. Neither Defense, nor State, nor the White House vetoed it.

After Powers went down, CIA wanted to take the public blame alone. But some State Department officials and press secretary James C. Hagerty argued that Mr. Eisenhower should personally accept public responsibility for the flight. He did so. Today, ironically, most of official Washington still believes Mr. Eisenhower didn't know beforehand about the last, tragic U-2 mission. Khrushchev, presumably, believes he did know.

The central issue of the CIA is not that it acts without authority; the issue is that CIA, once given an assignment, on occasion has exhibited an astonishing ineptitude in carrying it out.

The basic reason is that the CIA tendency to support the most militant anti-Communist is built into the system. Few Americans with any real skill in practical politics ever go into CIA. And when a CIA man goes abroad, the em-

An Eye for an Eye

by Kenneth Crawford

WE ARE a nation of hard losers. We bring up our young to win and to reserve their admiration for winners. The late Knute Rockne reflected the true American spirit in acknowledging that he wanted no good losers on his football teams. The coach who loses can expect to be hanged in effigy by the students and fired by the trustees. As a people we terribly want to win and, perhaps for that reason, we make a habit of winning.

In all this, President Kennedy is the ultimate American. Up until last week, he had never in his life lost a really important decision.

That is why the experience of losing in Cuba was more traumatic for him than for the country. Here was a venture planned, outfitted, and mounted by our presumably ablest intelligence and military experts with the specific approval of the President. It was an unmitigated failure. The Central Intelligence Agency bobbled the landing through mistaken intelligence estimates or faulty operations. Meanwhile, the President's statements and activities tended to make the Castro threat to our national security seem worse than it is in fact.

Once the dimensions of the tragedy became known, the inevitable hunt for scapegoats started. The President put a quick stop to this by calling off the hunters and himself accepting full responsibility for the misadventure. His perspective fully restored, he sensibly set about the business of discovering what had gone wrong, not to assess blame but to learn what he could from a humiliating defeat in order to avoid another like it.

FACTS NOT HEADS

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, retired former Army Chief of Staff, was recalled to conduct the inquiry. Working with him would be the President's brother Robert, Adm. Arleigh Burke, and Allen Dulles. Burke and Dulles would be reviewing their own errors for both had been involved in the Cuban affair. Their inclusion in the panel was an earnest of the President's desire for facts rather than heads.

The White House needed no inquiry to draw several tentative conclusions from the Bay of Pigs experience. The most important of them was that there is an indispensable element missing from the nation's organization for cold war. For want of a better designation, it is called paramilitary capacity. However serious the so-called missile gap may be, however inadequate in certain contingencies our conventional forces would be, our strength in these departments is nevertheless formidable.

Yet we could lose most of the world to Communism without getting a chance to defend it either with missile-borne atomic weapons or with Army, Navy, and Air Force. What we need in places like Laos, Vietnam, and even Cuba are experts in counter-subversion, counter-infiltration, and all the distasteful arts of undercover warfare.

MEN NAMED SMITH

Several agencies now engage in this kind of activity but on a limited scale. The CIA is presumed to have the largest covert force in being. The Pentagon has an office of special operations under Marine Lt. Gen. Graves B. Erskine, a specialist in guerrilla warfare, and Secretary of Defense McNamara recently appointed Air Force Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale his assistant in charge of unconventional war programs. Strange men in civilian attire invariably named Smith visit special operations headquarters and then disappear.

The White House feeling seems to be that there are not enough of these Smiths and that their talents are not well enough utilized. It is generally expected that Taylor will recommend that the CIA be required to confine itself to intelligence activities and divest itself of other operations. However, he may hesitate to house the Smiths at the Pentagon because the conventional forces are not really hospitable to the unconventional ideas and tactics indicated by the present unconventional world situation.

The American people, who want their games won cleanly and right away—no eye-gouging in the scrimmages unless absolutely unavoidable—won't like what they are permitted to know about paramilitary operations. But their predilection for winning will probably outweigh their scruples against an eye for an eye.

phasis is on getting intelligence, especially about what the Communists are doing, and the best way to find out about Reds is to establish contact with the national secret police.

An agent cannot hope to duplicate its network. "The result is that the system tends to make the U.S. clandestine allies of reaction," says a former CIA man who now holds elective office. "When it comes to recommendations about politics, the safe project is to support the element which is most anti-Communist."

Now, after Cuba and Laos, some Administration officials feel that CIA should spin off its political and military operations, and concentrate on intelligence.

The question of separating intelligence and operations is certain to come up before the committee—headed by Gen. Maxwell Taylor and including Attorney General Robert Kennedy—appointed by President Kennedy to review CIA's activities. Their report is almost sure to propose that the nation place greater emphasis on the creation of good democratic leaders in the emergent nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and on training national troops to win their own struggles for freedom.

Whatever the Taylor-Kennedy recommendations, Dulles himself may not be present to put them into effect. He is 68 now, and while he is still as active as any man on his staff, he will probably retire once President Kennedy knows whom he wants for the next CIA director. Dulles views this prospect with equanimity. "I couldn't have had a job more concerned with trying to unmask and defeat the objectives of Communism," he said recently, in a reflective mood. "If I can make a contribution here, I would like to leave the United States a better intelligence system."

UPI

Taylor: A new look at CIA